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Most  Latin American  and Caribbean  countries  have undertaken
far-reaching  and fundamental  reforms of their trade policies.
These  reforms have  been undertaken unilaterally under
extenuating  economic  conditions.  Their  success  lies in bold  and
consistent  implementation,  complementary  macroeconomic  and
exchange  rate policies,  and political  will and  resilience.
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This paper-  a product  of the  Trade, Finance,  and Private  Sector  Development  Division,  Latin America
and the Caribbean  Technical  Department  - is part of a larger effort in the department  to disseminate
lessons  of policy reform  in the Latin America  and the Caribbean  region.  Copies  of the paper  are available
free  from  the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Joy  Troncoso,  room
I4-059,  extension  37826 (February  1993,  25 pages).
Alarn and Rajapatirana  examine  the wide-  The trade reforms  were associated  with
ranging  and fundamental  trade reforms  changes  in the political  regimes.  In most coun-
undertaken  in 16 Latin American  and Caribbean  tnies,  the reforms  began  under the auspices  of
countries  in the 1980s.  These reforms  have  democraticaly  elected  govenmments,  despite
dramatically  altered  the nature of the trade  resistance  - belying the conventional  wisdom
regimes  in these counrees and are  particularly  that democratic  leaders  are particularly
significant  because  they were undertaken  during  vulnerable  to powerful  special-interest  groups
severe  economic  crisis and uncertainty.  and are  thus less able to sustain reforms.  Crucial
to the success  in implementing  these reforms
Alam and Rajapatirana  show that the  was the boldness  with which the govenmments
average  levels and the growth rates  of imports  pursued  them.
and exports  were substantially  higher  during the
reform  period. But imports  did not show the  Alam  and Rajapatirana  point out that the
surge  many had expected,  possibly  because  of  success  of the trade reforms  lies in ensuring  their
low domestic  demand.  Domestic  demand  was  domestic  viability  through  macroeconomic
low because  of stabilizatio.i  and structural  stability  and growth.  A successful  conclusion  of
adjustment  policies, real exchange  rate  the Uruguay  Round of multilateral  trade
devaluations,  and limited axess to foreign  loans.  negotiations  would  also enable  the countries  to
realize  greater  benefits from their trade reforms,
All the trade reforms  were  prceded or  making  them  more sustainable.
accompanied  by restrictive  fiscal and monetary
policies and by devaluations  of the real exchange
rate.  The reform  period also moved  toward  the
unification  and floating  of exchange  rates.
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Seres disseminates  the rmddgs  of work  under  way  inthe  Bank.  An  objective  of the  series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less thm fully  polished The fmdmgs, intepretations, and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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ui1.  INTRODUCTION
Latin American and Caribbean  countries  undertook  wide-ranging  trade reforms in the 1980s,
even in the midst of severe economic  crisi  and uncertainty. These reforms dramatically  altered the
nature of the trade regimes in these countries  and made them among  the most open economies in the
developing  world.  An examination  of the nature of the reforms, the context  in which they were
undertaken, and their results provides insight  into the reform process itself and offers lessons for
other countries.'
This paper examines a sample of 16 countries in the region.  The paper is divided into six
sections. Following this Introduction,  section 2 describes the nature of the trade reforms and their
impact  on the trade regimes, imports and exports in these countries. Section  3 analyzes  the context in
which the reforms were undertaken in terms of the macroeconomic  situation, the accompanying
macroeconomic  policies, the behavior of exchange  rates, Lnd  the political economy  of the reforms.
Section  4 draws lessons from this experience,  section 5 identifies  the challenges  for the future, and
section 6 provides a brief conclusion. Given the limitations of space, only aggregate  statistics are
provided. The relatively short period since the trade reforms also precludes  discussion  of the effects
on output, savings, and investment.
Latin American and Caribbean  countries  experienced  tremendous  macroeconomic  crises in the
early 1980s. Although most of these countries  had sporadic crises in the past, those of the 1980s
were particularly  harrowing for several reasons. The two oil shocks of the 1970s  had raised import
prices at a time when growth was already slow. The beginning  of the debt crisis in 1982 further
exacerbated  the poor economic  situation. These countries had undertaken  heavy foreign  borrowing to
finance high import bills and to sustain a public sector investment  boom.  When interest rates rose in
the early 1980s, this high burden of debt made structural adjustment  inevitable.
An important ingredient  of the overall adjustment  these countries  undertook  was extensive  trade
reforms. These trade reforms were motivated  not only by the debt crisis, which precluded further
external borrowing for financing  deficits, but also by the success of outward-oriented  trade regimes in
other parts of the world, an international  environment  that increasingly  favored  liberal trade policies,
and domestic success with macroeconomic  stabilization.
1  For  earlier swdies of trade refonns see, e.g., Michaely,  Papageorgiou  and Choksi (1991),  Nogues  and Gulad (199),
and Rajapatziana  (1992).2
The experiences  of these  countries  with  the trade  reforms  illustrates  that  the key ingredients  of
a successfidl  reform  strategy  include  boldness  and  consistency  of policy  implementation  and
complementary  macroeconomic  and exchatnge  rate  policies. However,  these  reforms  will be
sustainable  only if they  result In domestic  macroeconomic  stability  and  growth,  and if the international
environment  is committed  to open and  liberal  trade  policies.
2.  CHARACTERISIICS  OF THE TRADE  REFORMS
A.  Prem  Trade Reime
Table 1  presents  the main  characteristics  of the  trade regimes  of these  16 countries  at the start
of the reforms  of the 1980s. Most  of these  countries  had high  tariffs, foreign  exchange  restrictions,
quantitative  restrictions  (QRs)  on both imports  and  exports,  export  taxes,  and multiple  exchange  rates.
TABLE 1: TRADE  IMElb CHARACTEIRtSTICS  AT THE  START OF TnE TRADE  REFORMS
Yer  Reform  HWh  Tarif  ForIn  tdn_  QEs an  xpetl Tax  MUIdpI
Sared  Exchange  and/Or  Ehae
Rnom06"  Rd
AWat"in  1988^* 
Bras  1987  h  *s*ee
Charo  1988  *  *
-310ibha  1985  C  *
Colombia  1985 
Costa  Rica  196  *
EBuador  1989  *  *
Guatenml  1986  *  *  *  d 
Honduras  1986  *  *  C
Jamsica  1982  .*  *  C
Mexico  1985  C  *  *
Paguay  1989
PaLr  1989  *  C  *  *  C
Tndad  & Tobago  1989  *
Uruguay  1987  C
Venezauel  1989  *
No. of Countrie  16  16  IS  13  11  8
Soume: World  Bank  (various  repots)3
Many  of these  trade  barriers'were  raised  during  tbe early 1980s  in an effort  to respond  to  balance-of-
payments  crises. However,  these  barriers  fiurther  reinforced,  in varying  degrees,  the inward
orientation  that  characterized  these  countties'  trade  policies  for much  of the postwar  era.
B.  TiA Trade Peforms
The trade  i.orms  were  aimed  at replacinj  the inward  orientation  of the trade  regimes  with
neutral  incentives  for Imports  and exports. Reforming  import  policy  involved  dismantling  the tariff
structures  and eliminating  non-tariff  barriers  such  as quantitative  restrictions,  official  reference  prices,
and  foreign  exchange  allocations.  Export  policy  reform  entailed  reducing  or eliminating  price  and
quantitative  barriers  to exports  and introducing  or improving  measures  for export  promotion  and
diversification.  These  reforms  were  accompanied  by complementary  macroeconomic  and exchange
rate  policies  (discused  in section  3 below).
The reforms  adopted  by each  of these  countries  reflect  the nature  of the protecionist
instruments  that  characterized  their pre-reform  trade  regimes. For example,  in Chile,  the only
significant  trade  restriction  in place  when  reform  was  undertaken  in 1985  was  a uniform  tariff  rate  of
35  percent. Trade  reform,  therefore,  simply  involved  a reduction  of this tariff level. In Peru, on the
other  hand,  trade  policy  prior  to the start  of reforms  in 1989  was  characterized  by high  levels  and
dispersion  of tariffs,  extensive  non-tariff  barriers,  an overvalued  exchange  rate, a multiple  exchange
rate system,  fiscal  and  financial  subsidies  for exports,  some  export  taxes  and restrictions,  and rampant
use of discretion  In the conduct  of trade  policy. Trade  reform  in Peru, therefore,  involved  the
complete  menu  of reforms.
The p- )cess  of trade  reform,  specifically  the reduction  of protectionist  barriers  to imports  and
the emphasis  on export  expansion,  led these  Latin  American  and Caribbean  countries  to seek  GATr
membership,  both to lock  in their  own  trade  reforms  and  to seek  to bind  foreign  trade  regulations  that
impinged  on their  trade. In turn, GATT  membership  has reinforced  and extended  the reform  process
by forcing  the adoption  of GATT-consistent  rules on .nti-dumping,  subsidies,  and customs  valuation.
The countries  have  also sought  a more  active  participAtion  in the multilateral  trade  negotiations  in
areas critical  to them,  such  as agriculture  and textiles.4
C.  Imnact on the Trade Regimes
The extensive and dramatic  nature of the trade reforms in these countries is illustrated  by table
2, which compares certain features  of the regimes before and after reform.  There are several
common  characteristics. First, nominal  protection, as indicated  by average tariff rates, was reduced
dramatically. The reducuon was more substantial in some countries,  such as Brazil, Costa Rica, and
Colombia, than in others.  Second, the reforms substantially  reduced  tariff ranges, implying a reduced
variance in protection. ITird, most of the new tariff ranges include  only a few tariff rates, which
indicates  a firther reduction in the dispersion  of protection. For example, the Central American
countries have only four legal tar.ff rates, Jamaica has five, and Uruguay  has only three.
Nonetheless,  only Chile has a uniform tariff rate.  Fourth, the coverage of quantitative  import
restrictions has been dramatically  reduced, and is negligible  in almost all 16 countries for reasons
other than health and public safety. 2 Quantitative  restrictions on latter grounds are, however, quite
significant  in the case of Guatemala  (29 percent of domestic  manufacturing  production  before reform),
and their implementation  can be potentially  restrictive. Fifth, the degree of openness, as measured  by
the sum of real exports and imports  as a ratio of GDP, has increased  significantly  for all the
countries, including  the larger ones.  The overall average for these countries has increased from a
pre-reform level of 49 percent to a post-reform  (1991) average of 58 percent.  While this ratio
reflects many factors, it does indicate  the positive change induced  by the trade reforms.
There have been significant  differences  between these countries  in the extent and speed of the
reforms, and also in their timing.  Some countries such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and
Uruguay, had initiated trade reforms in the 1970s  and were forced to reverse them, at least partially,
at some point during the early 1980s  in the wake of the macroeconomic  crises.  Chile was among  the
first to start extensive trade reforms in 1974, and by 1980, it had a very transparent and open trading
system with a low uniform tariff rate of only 10 percent and no non-tariff  barriers.  After a brief
partial reversal of trade reforms in the early 1980s, Chile restarted the process of lowering its import
barriers in 1985. While the remaining  11 countries started the reform  process only in the 1980s, their
reforms have been no less dramatic  than those undertaken by the early reformers.
2  While  QRs have  falle  subatay,  some  other  forms  of non-tarff  bi  ren in hgnifica  in somm  courieu.  For
example,  Uxuguay till h.  sgnificart  reference  pries and  minimum  unport prces, and  Costa Rica ha a pnor depoit
requireaent  of 30 peace  of  he ce.f. value  of inmpors. Some  of non-tariff  barriers  are  of  morm  sector-specific  kin  mch 
loal-contt  lda  limit impors  of automobile  parts  in Argentina,  Chile, and  Colombia,  for examle.TABLE  2:  SOME INDICATORS  OF TRADE  REGIMES BEFORE AND AlTER REFORM
COUNTRY  Average Unwegbted  Covemp  of QRs an Imports  Cp_ef  E  _tny (pre-reonn  year, pos-reorm  Legal Tariff Rates (V'  Taiff  Range (S)  (*  of taiff  _  (smpoufE+Eups  w  S1  GD?, year)  maim_os  ise  noeoed*  180piae)
Pro-reform  [Portd-eform  fI_'nf"  pos-rfom  rrre  f  Fest-ref.rms(19)
Argentia (1987, 1991)  42 (p)  15  15-115(p)  5-22  62 (of dom. prod.)  A few  38.S7  S432
Bolivia  (1985, 1991)  12 (m)  8  NA  5-10  NA  Minu  57.51  SI83.97
Brazil  (1987, 1992)  51  21  0-105  0-65  39  Minri  21.17  25.27
Chile (1984,1991)  35  11  35  11  minial  0  44.96  S6.34
Colombia  (1984,1992)  61  12  0-220  5-20  99  1  21.23  32.66
Costa Rica (1985, 1992)  53 (p)  15 (p)  0-1400  (p)  5-20  NA  0  S8.66  78.97
Ecuador  (1989, 1992)  37 (p)  18  0-338  (p)  2-25 (1)  100  0  48.73  50.84
Guatemnba  (1985, 1992)  |  S(p)  15 (p)  5-90  5-20  6(ofdom. prod.XO)  0 (2)  31.31  3S.56
Hondurs (1985, 1992)  41 (p)  15 (w, p)  5-90  5-20  NA  0  62.82  61.76  IA
lamaica  (1981, 1991)  NA  20  NA  0C45  NA  0 ()  105.51  163.49
Mexico  (1985, 1990)  24 (w)  13 (w)  0-100  0-20  92 (of dom. prod.)  20 (of dor.  prod.)  22.63  3431
Paraguay  (1988, 1991)  NA  16  NA  3-86  NA  A few  51.01  63.14
Peru (1988,1992)  NA  17  0-120  5-25  100  0(3)  30.37  41.58
Trinidad  & Tobago  (1989,1991)  NA  41 (p)  NA  0-103  (p)  NA  A few (4)  124.89  141.21
Uruguay(1987,  1992)  32  18  1o-Ss  12-24  0  0  38.04  45.10
Venezek  (1989, 1991)  0-37  1  0135  O-SO  40  10(5)  4925  53.29
p:  ijcluding  tariff surchage  w: poduecion-weghted  averge taiff  m: impot-wehed  average aiff
* Even where  tariff ie  covenge is small, domestic  production  covee  my  be rSgifican
1/ Ecuador  also has a specific  tarff  of 40 peren  on automobiles.
21  Guatetmla  hs  ificant  QRs  for health  and safety  rmaso;  pe-efiom,  dNy  coveted  29 pecet  of domesti mamfacuag  production.
31  Some  QRs do exist for health  and safety reasos.
41  On agricur  products  only
51  Anotber 8 perent of tarff itm  a  resrcicted  because  of heach reasn  prorfr,  h  a#mbet ws S peret
Sowe:  Wozld  Bank  (vadows  pon,  staff estimas,  ad  ANDREDQ6
D.  Impait on  Imaorts  and lorts
The trade  reforms  had a marked  impact  on both  the average  levels  and  the growth  rates  of
imports  and exports. However,  the Improved  Import  performance  cannot  be attributed  to Import
liberalization  alone;  economic  recovery,  which  raised  incomes  and increased  foreign  borrowint,  also
stimulated  imports.
Tbe average  lev,_  of real imports  during  the reform  years  (through  1991)  for these  countries
was  6 percent  higher  than  during  the pre-reform  period  (see  appendix  table A.  1). Real imports  were
higher  for 10 of the 16 countries.  For 9 of these,  import  levels  were more  than  10 percent  higher  than
during  the pre-reform  period,  and  Costa  Rica,  Jamaica  and Paraguay  had import  levels  more  than SO
percent  higher. Although  real import  levels  were  lower,  on average,  during  the reform  years  for
Argentina,  Colombia,  Guatemala,  Peru, Trinidad  and Tobago,  and Venezuela,  all of them  except
Venezuela  had  higher  levels  when  the comparison  is made  to the year immediately  preceding  the trade
reforms.
The  picture  is more  uniform  in terms  of import  growth  rates  (see appendix  table  A.2). The
overall  average  growth  rate  for these  countries  increased  from -1.1 percent  during  the  pre-reform
period  to 7.2 percent  during  the reform  years. All 16 countries  had increased  import  growth  rates,
except  for Venezuela  which  started  its trade  reforms  only  in 1989,  and whose  import  growth  rate  has
begun  to rise, increasing  by over 50 percent  in 1991. Six countries  had average  annual  increass in
the import  growth  rate of over 10  percent. The average  annual  increase  in the import  growth  rate
was highest  in Mexico,  where  it  -se 24 percent. Both  Argentina  and  Chile  showed  an average
increase  in excess  of 15  percent.  For some  other  countries,  such  as Colombia,  Honduras,  and
Jamaica,  the increase  was more  modest,  at around  2 percent.
While  real imports  have  increased  significantly,  they  have  not shown  the surge  many  expected
for three  main  reasons. First, in all the countries  trade  reforms  were introduced  in conjunction  with
stabilization  and struc' fal adjustment  policies  which  kept domestic  demand  low  during  this period,
with  many  countries  experiencing  negative  growth  rates. Since  domestic  demand  is a major
determinant  of import  demand,  this kept  import  levels  low. Second,  as we discuss  below,  in several
Instances  the trade  reforms  were  preceded  or accompanied  by major  real devaluations  which  kept7
imports  depressed.  Third, foreign  borrowing  was  no longer  as readily  available  as before  the debt
crisis  of 1982.
The average  level  of real exports  is also  higher  in the reform  years  than  during  the pre-reform
years. In fact, real  exports  were  almost  38 percent  higher  in the reform  years (see  appendix  table
A.3). Only  Guatemala  and  Peru  had lower  average  export  values  in the reform  years,  but im  both
countries  real  exports  were higher  than  during  the year  Immediately  preceding  the trade  reforms. The
average  increase  in real  export  growth  rates  during  the refbrm  period  is 5  percent  (see  appendix  table
A.4).  Eleven  of the 16 countries  had increased  export  growth  rates, with 4 showing  average  annual
increases  in excess  of 10 percent. Only  Mexico,  Ecuador,  and  Trinidad  and  Tobago  had significant
declines  in the export  growth  rate (four  other  countries  show  negative  changes  in growth  rates, but
these  changes  were  less  than 1 percent). Exports  showed  strong  growth  in Trinidad  and  Tobago  in
1990  but stagnated  in 1991.  Ecuador's  export  growth  rate  picked  up after 1989.
E.  Snuencing the Elements  of Trade Reform
Concern  over  the sequencing  of trade  reform  has normally  focused  on the timing  of other
policy  measures  involving  macroeconomic  stabilization  or capital  account  liberalization.  However,  it
Is also necessary  to examine  the sequence  of the various  elements  of the trade  reform  package  itself.
In this regard,  two  issues  arose  for these  countries:  What  was the sequence  to be followed,  if any, in
the reform  of Import  and  export  policy? And  what  was the sequence  to be followed,  if any, in
reducing  tariffs  and quotas  on the import  side?
With  respect  to the first issue, the concern  was  that a simultaneous  reduction  of both  export
taxes  and import  tariffs  would  reduce  government  revenues  at a time when  a relatively  steady  level  of
public  expenditure  was needed  to stabilize  the economies.  Several  countries  considered  raising  export
taxes  to offset  the decline  of import  tariff revenues  resulting  from a reduction  in tariff  rates. There
was, of course,  concern  that  raising  export  tax rates  would  increase  the bias against  exports,  but both
the large devaluations  and the reduction  of tariff  rates  were already  working  to reduce  the bias against
exports.  Moreover,  it was felt that  the devaluations  had  provided  exporters  with short-run  rents  that
needed  to be recovered  by increased  export  taxes.8
In the end, only 6 of the 16 countries  - Argentina,  Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and
Guatemala, - increased  export taxes at the start of the trade reforms, as indicated by the implicit
export duty3  (see appendix  table A.5).  The case of Argentina  demonstrates  the use of higher export
taxes to offset the loss in government  revenues from tariff reform.  In Argentina, the implicit export
duty rose from 2.95 percent in 1988 to 14.94 percent in 1989 (see appendix  table AS5)  while  the
implicit import duty 4 declined  during the same period from 16.08 percent to 7.02 percent (see
appendix table A.6).  For the other countries for which information  is available, the implicit export
duty was 1 percent or less prior to the reforms and diminished  even further as the reforms
progressed.  In 5 countries,  there were no export taxes following  the reforms.
Thus, raising export  taxes prior to reducing tariffs was not a common  practice despite the
concerns of countries over losing public revenues. Moreover, this concern  proved to be unfounded,  as
trade tax revenues rose in most cases due to the replacement  of QRs by import tariffs, import and
export growth, and the valuation  of trade flows at depreciated  exchange  rates.
The second issue with respect to sequencing  that arose for these countries was the order in
which quantitative  restrictions  and tariffs were to be reduced. Like the first issue, this also involved
fiscal concerns. The norm has been to reduce QRs first by converting  them into tariffs, which has
the advantage  of raising  tariff revenues  prior to any tariff reductions  and thereby undermining
revenue-based  opposition  to such tariff cuts.  Reducing  QRs and tariffs simultaneously  works to
neutralize the possible negative  effects of tariff cuts on tariff revenues, while also providing  a stronger
signal of the direction  of government  policy. Note that these arguments  presume that tariff reductions
lead to revenue losses, but the removal of inordinately  high tariffs or import surcharges would not
reduce revenues if those rates were prohibitive and precluded imports.5
3  The iplicit  export  duty  is the raio of export  duties  collected  to the fo.b.  valuo  of merchandise  expots; implicit
export  duties are used instead  of the nominal  export  tax rates because  the latter  are not  unifonrdy available.
4  1Tho  rdo  of the total  import  duties  colLected  to the c.i.f. value  of merchandise  impos.
5  In fact, tariff revenues  ny  actaally  increase  if imports  are stimulated  by the lower  tariffs, fo11owing  a Laffer  curve.
However, evidonce  for this is not available  because  of lack  of adequate  time  wAies  data on tariff rates.9
The countries made different  choices on the sequencing  of reductions  in QRs and tariffs.
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru reduced both simultaneously.
Reductions  in QRs preceded tariff cuts in Brazil, Yamaica,  and Mexico, while  tariffs were reduced
before QRs In Costa Rica and Venezuela. Chile, Guatemala,  Paraguay  and Uruguay  had low or
insignificant  QRs prior to reform, and so their reforms involved  only tariff cuts.  Trinidad and
Tobago cut QRs only.  Costa Rica felt the need to increase minimum  tariffs by 5 percent in 1990 and
later to impore a tariff surcharge of 10 percent, from January to August  of 1991, in order to raise
fiscal revenues; it can be argued that had reductions in QRs come first, there would have been no
need for these tariff increases.
The evidence  suggests  that reductions  in the legal tariff rate lead to reductions  in the implicit
import duty.  This is borne out by the example  of three countries  that posted tariff cuts only with no
reduction in QRs: Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. For Chile, the implicit  import duty shot up in
1985, the first year of the reforms, because tarff cuts were introduced  only in July 1985 and their
impact was not fully reflected in that year's implicit import duty (particularly  since nominal tariffs
had been raised from 10 percent to 35 percent in 1984). Chile's subsequent  tariff cuts reduced the
implicit  import duty thereafter. Paraguay and Uruguay had decreasing  implicit  import duties during
the reform years.  In Bolivia, the implicit import duty jumped in the first year of the reforms when
QRs were completely  eliminated,  even though tariffs were also reduced; thereafter, as tariffs alone
were cut,' the implicit import duty fell.  An exception  to this rule was Guatemala,  where implicit
import duty did not fail with cuts in the legal tariff rates.  This can be explained  by the simultaneous
elimination  of tariff exemptions  which may have reduced import volumes  and increased  tariff
revenues.
But the remaining  countries  present ambigious  evidence  about  the relationship  between the
import duty ratios and the sequencing  of the import policy reforms. Ihis  may be expected for those
countries where QRs and tariffs were reduced  simultaneously,  but the picture remains unclear even
where QR reductions  preceded tariff cuts.  An exception  is Mexico, which started off its reforms in
1985  with a reduction in QRs and saw its implicit import duty rise; however, as Mexico thereafter
also introduced  tariff cuts, the import duty ratio began to fluctuate.10
3.  CONTCON  OF THE TS  REFORMS  '
A.  ltial  Macroeconomic  CoSdiou
As table  3 shows,  trade  reforms  were implemented  during  a period  of widespread  economic
crises  for most  of the countries,  which  were suffering  under  large  debt  overhangs,  declining  output,
balance-of-  payments  problems,  falling  foreign  exchange  reserves,  and  high inflation. Of course,  the
intensity  of each  of these  problems  varied  across  these  countries.  For example,  in the year
immediately  before  the start  of the reforms,  inflation  rates  in Bolivia  were in excess  of 1,000  percent,
while  they  were  about  60 percent  in Ecuador.  In the five years  preceding  the reforms,  real  output  in
TABLE  3: THE EXTENT  OF ECONOMIC  CRISIS  AT THE  START OF THE TRADE  REFORMS
BoP  Declining  Foei  HIgh  Economi  Debt
Problem (1)  Exch.  Resrves  flatdon  M)  Decline  (3)  Problem  (4)
Argentina  a  *
Bolivia  a  a
Brazil  a
uile  ~~~~*  a 
Colombia  a  a  a  a
Costa Rica  a  a  e  a
Ecuador  a  a  a  a  a
Guatemal  a  a  a
Honduras  a  a  a
Jamaica  *  a  a  a
Mexico  a  a  a
Paraguay  a  a
Peru  a  a  a  a
Trinidad  & Tobago  *  a  a  a
Urguay  a  e  a  a
Venezuela  a  *  a
No. of Countries  16  10  7  12  16
1/ increasing  or consistent  lrge  curent account  and/or balnce of paymens deficits
V inflation  in the year preceding  reforms  in exceu of 50 percent Bolivia  had tbe highest  rates, in excess  of 1,000  perent,  with Pern
following  with 667 percent,  Brazil  with 145  percent,  A  ninm with 131 percent nd Ecuador,  Mexico and UNguay between  50 and 80
percent.
3/ negative  or decreasing  real GDP growth rtes.
4/ debt problem aid to exist if a country  had falen back  on debt payments  and/or had to reschedule  or refinance  debt.
Source:  World Bank  (various  repoalu)11
Bolivia  had  fallen  by 12  percent  while  it had risen  by 17  percent  in Venezuela.  The diagnosis  and
extent  of the economic  crisis  Is highlighted  by the fact  that  all 16 countries  were  characterized  by at
least  three of the five  symptoms  listed  and  that  three  countries  suffered  from all five.
B.  Cornlemenj=  Macroeconomic  Policiss
For these  Latin  American  and Caribbean  countries,  the profligacy  of the 1970s  inevitably  gave
way  to the austerity  of the 1980s,  as the debt  crisis  foreclosed  the option  for foreign  borrowing  that
had financed  much  of the public-sector  investment  and  import  booms  of the 1970s. All the trade
reforms  under  study  were  either  preceded  or accompanied  by restrictive  fiscal  and monetary  policies,
which  by reducing  real expenditures,  facilitated  t!o improvements  in the balance  of payments  that
enabled  the trade  reforms  to proceed. Tight  fiscal  policies  also ensured  that the accompanying  real
devaluations  of the exchange  rates (discussed  below)  were  noninflationary.
C.  Exchange  Rate Poll
Several  elements  of exchange  rate policy  are relevant  to the trade  reforms. First, there is a
need  to unify  multiple  exchange  rates  so as to help  reduce  dispersion  in the effective  rates  of
protection,  which  results  from multiple  rates. Exchange  rate  unification  also  reduces  the discretionary
element  of governmental  action. The evidence  from  these  countries  is nearly  uniform.  of the eight
countries  with  multiple  exchange  rates, all but one (Ecuador)  unified  their rates  during  the period  of
the trade  reforms.  Second,  realistic  exchange  rates  need  to be adopted  by making  appropriate
devaluations  or by floating  the currency. Third,  both  theory  and practice  suggest  that  trade  policy
reforms,  at given  real  exchange  rates,  lead to an excess  demand  for tradeables  which  needs  to be
offset  by an increase  in the price of tradeables  relative  to nontradeables  - that  is, by a depreciation  of
the real exchange  rate. The exchange  rate  policy,  therefore,  needs  to be directed  to this end.
The evidence  on real exchange  rate movements  is that the trade  reforms  were always  preceded
by, or associated  with,  significant  depreciations  of the real exchange  rate. The nominal  exchange  rate
was devalued  substantially  for all the countries  (see  appendix  table  A.7).  In eight  countries  (Bolivia,
Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Guatemala,  Paraguay,  Uruguay,  and  Venezuela),  these  devaluations
brought  about  a condnuous  depreciation  of the real  exchange  rate for the entire  duration  of the
reforms  (see  appendix  table A.8). For six of these  countries  (Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Guatemala,
Paraguay,  and  Venezuela),  the devaluations  preceded  the trade reforms. For the other  eight  countries12
(Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,  Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago), the
magnitude  of the nominal devaluations  was insufficient  to condnuously  offset the inflation  differentials
between the country  and its trading partners.  But of these, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Trinidad and
Tobago had real depreciations  both prior to and upon the start of the reforms.  Four other countries -
Brazil, Honduras, Jamaica, and Mexico - had significant  real depreciations  sometime  during the
reform years or in the years leading to the reforms. Only in Peru were trade reforms not aided by
real depreciations  (despite substantial  depreciation  of the nominal  exchange rate).  The appreciation  of
Peru's real exchange rate during this period may be attributed  to other reasons, such as the rise of
Peru's coca economy (which  may be as large ps one-third  of official exports), large capital inflows
attracted by the relatively  high real interest rates due to tight monetary  policy, and the wealmess  of
import demand.
The period of reform has also seen a movement  toward floating exchange  rates.  Just one
country, Uruguay, had floated its exchange rate prior to the reforms, but nine more countries  had
done so by 1991. Other countries  have demonstrated  greater flexibility in managing  their fixed or
crawling exchange rate regimes. This may indicate  that the exchange  rate will be used less often as a
'nominal anchor' in the fight against inflation, which in turn, could enhance the sustainabiity of the
trade reforms.
D.  The Political Economy of the Trade Reforms
The trade reforms introduced  in the 1980s  were distinguished  by the determination  and
boldness with which the governments  initiated and pursued them.  Not only have the reforms suffered
no major reversal, in many countries, incoming democratic  governments  adopted austere economic
policies, including the trade policy reforms, despite serious  political opposition. Governments  took
such politically  unpopular  and risky steps largely because  the economic  crises had irrevocably
discredited  past macroeconomic  and trade policies and they really had no alternative: drastic reform
provided the only hope for improving  the economic  environment  and thereby ensuring their own
political futures.  The conjunction  of this 'political' interest with the 'national'  interest facilitated
bold action.  However, to restore economic  growth, countries  first had to resolve their foreign debt
problems and gain access to international  lending, and hence there was a need for support from the
IMF and World Bank.  But in order to obtain this support, the countries  had to satisfy IMF and
World Bank conditionalities,  which included trade policy reforms. Thus, the realization  that drastic13
remedial  measures  were required,  which  emanated  from the prevailing  economic  distress,  was only
reinforced  by the IMF and World  Bank  conditionality.
A change  in the political  regime  in all 16 countries  also directly  introduced  or invigorated  the
trade  policy  reforms. Furthermore,  in 15  of these  countries,  the trade  reforms  began  under  the
auspices  of democratically  elected  governments.  The exception  is Chile,  where  the military
administration  of General  Pinochet  initiated  the reforms. Ihis is not  to suggest,  however,  that
democratic  governments  have  a greater  proclivity  to introduce  successful  trade  reforms  than  autocratic
regimes;  earlier  episodes  of reform  have  had autocratic  governments  taking  bold  steps  towards  trade
reforms. What  has been  crucial  to the success  of reforms  is the boldness  with  which  governments
pursue  them. The success  of democratic  governments  in implementing  these  reforms  is noteworthy  in
that  it belies  the conventional  wisdom  that  democratic  leaders  are particularly  vulnerable  to powerfu
special  interest  groups,  and  therefore  less  able  to sustain  the reforms.
4.  LESSONS  FROM TIlE TRADE  REFORMS
Five important  lessons  can be derived  from  the experience  of the trade  reforms  in Latin
America  and  the Caribbean  during  the 1980s.
(1)  Dade reforms  are succes4fid  (fdaey  are bold  and oe,elve.  Bold  and extensive  reforms  send  a
powerfl signal  of the direction  of goverment policy  and liberate  policy  from  parochial  and
vested  interests. In these  Latin  American  and Caribbean  countries,  the boldness  of the reforms
has been  accentuated  by the extenuating  economic  circumstances  under  which  the refbrms  took
place  and  the extensive  nature  of the reforms  has been  demonstrated  by the complete  menu  of
measures  implemented  and  the substantial  reduction  of trade  barriers  that  has resulted. Several
factors  contributed  to making  the reforms  bold and  extnsive, including  the urgent  need  for
drastic  measures  to improve  the economy  in the face  of economic  crises,  the discrediting  of
past  policies,  changes  in the  political  regimes,  and IMF and  World  Bank  conditionality.
(2)  lhe success  of the reforms  requires  a supporting  macroeconomic  environment.  Trade  reforms
in all the countries  were  initiated  and maintained  in the context  of tight  monetary  and fiscal
policies.  These are necessary  not only  to reduce  real expenditures,  and  thereby  improve  the
balance  of payments,  but also  to ensure  that  the accompanying  real  devaluations  are14
noninflationary.  For example,  In  both Chile  and Mexico,  prudent  fiscal  adjustment  has been
crucial  to the success  of their  trade  reforms  and  to their strong  recent  growth.
(3)  Dade reforms  should  be preceded  or accomparned  by a depreciadon  of he real  exchange  rate.
Real  devaluations  ensure  the sustanability  of the trade reforms  by offsetting  the excess  demand
for tradeables  that the reforms  induce. Such  devaluations  should  always  precede  or accompany
the trade reforms. While  the real exchange  rate is not a policy  variable  per se, nominal
devaluations  and restrictive  macroeconomic  policies  can effectively  influence  it.  This also
means  eschewing  the use of the exchange  rate as an anti-inflation  instrument,  which  was
common  during  the pre-reform,  import-substitution  days.
(4)  7)ade  reforms  are succes#l despite  d(erent sequencing  of the elements  of trade  reforms.
Brazil  and Mexico  reduced  their quantitative  restrictions  on imports  before  engaging  in tariff
cts,  while  Costa  Rica and Venezuela  followed  the reverse  sequence,  and  yet their  reforms
were very successful.  Likewise,  the sequencing  of reductions  in import  tariffs  and  increases  in
exort taxes  have also not  impinged  significantly  on the trade  reforms.
(5)  DeocatIc  goerments  can  and  do resst ppular pressures  and  powerfil bnterest  groups  to
*rk  In the natdonal  Interest.  To the extat that  trade  reforms  were implemented  in
conjunction  with  painful  economic  stabilization  measures,  these  aracted resistance  in many
countries.  Also, in many  countries,  moves  towards  more  open  trading  policies  meant
hallenging  the powerl  military-industrial  complex  which  had  benefited  most  from the
erstwhile  protectionist  trade  policies  and  therefore  had the most  to lose. But democratic
governmes have  overcome  these  to successfully  introduce  the trade  reforms.
S.  CHALLENGES  FOR THE FUTURE
While  the trade reforms  in Latin  America  and the Caribbean  have  been  pathbreaking  and
successfid,  their  continued  success  lies in ensuring  that they  are not reversed. The experiences  of
these  countries  suggest  that  the best way  to do this is to promote  and  maintain  a stable
macroeconomic  environment  through  prudent  fiscal  management,  economic  deregulation,  financial
sector  reforms,  and  greater  competition.  Many  of these  countries  have  already  achieved  success  on
this front. Some,  like  Brazil,  still  have  a long way  to go.1S
Ihe trade  reforms  have  been accompanied  by significant  moves  towards  regional  integration.
Several  past initiatives  have  been  reinvigorated  -such  as the Andean  Group,  the Central  American
Common  Market,  and  the Caribbean  Community  - and  a new  arrangement,  MERCOSUR,  was
created  In 1991  by Argentina,  Brazil,  Paaguay,  and  Uruguay. While  these  recent  efforts  towards
regional  integration  are distinct  from earlier  efforts  In that  they  are motivated  by the need  to open
markets  and  expand  trade  rather  than  to protect  regional  markets,  they still  face  tremendous
challenges  in ensuring  that: (1) their  net effect  Is  trade  creation  and not  trade diversion,  (2)  the
regional  trading  arrangements  complement  the multilateral  trading  arrangements  and are not  permitted
to become  substitutes  for it, and (3) these  arrangements  adhere  to GATT's  Article  XXIV  ensuring  that
regional  trading  arrangements  promote  trade  and are not  used  to restrict  market  access  by third
countries.
A successful  conclusion  of the Uruguay  Round  of multilateral  trade  negotiations  would
acilitate  the sustainability  and  the deepening  of the trade  reforms  as the Latin  American  and
Caribbean  countries  stand  to gain  tremendot  ,:y from  it.  These  gains  would  come  from increased
market  access  worldwide,  reduced  agricultural  subsidies  in the industrial  countries,  liberalization  of
the Multi-Fibre  Arrangement,  and improved  rules  of behavior. Such  transparent,  significant,  and
tangible  benefits  will undermine  the protectionist  voices  within  these  countries  and strengthen  the
voices  of reform  and openness.
6.  CONCLUSIONS
The 16  Latin  American  and Caribbean  countries  studied  here have  undertaken  far-reaching  and
fundamental  reforms  of their  trade policies  which  have  significantly  moved  them  towards  outward-
oriented  trade regimes.  These  reforms  have  been  undertaken  unilaterally  under  extenuating  economic
conditions  and in the face  of continued  stalemate  in the multilateral  trading  negotiations.  Their
success  was due  to bold  and consistent  implementation,  complementary  macroeconomic  and  exchange
rate policies,  political  will  and resilience,  and  support  of the IMF and  World  Bank. Their  future
success  lies in ensuring  their  domestic  viability  through  proper  macroeconomic  stability  and  growth.16
APPENDIX TABLESTABLE  A.1:  REAL  CMPORTS  OF GOODS  AND NONFACTOR  SRV1  @Uo  of 1980  US  doflars)
Pediod  Avega  % chmwV
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  PRefm"  Rdlom
Argegiam  13.93  12.59  7.26  6.91  7.34  628  7.42  8.07  6.90  5.72  5.73  9.91  8.73  7.06  -19.04
Bolva  0.84  1.16  0.73  0.76  0.63  0.90  0.88  0.95  0.85  0.95  1.00  1.03  0.83  0.94  13.40
Brzil  26.56  23.28  21.87  18.06  17.53  17.53  22.56  21.89  21.65  23.58  25.9S  27.34  21.05  24.08  1438
Cuhil  7.44  8.61  5.48  4.65  5.42  4.82  5.29  6.19  6.94  8.69  8.74  9.49  6.32  7.17  13.42
Cokmbia  5.21  5.46  5.90  5.36  5.1S  4.81  5.01  S.27  5.62  5.46  6.05  5.69  5.42  S.42  0.04
Cost Rica  1.78  131  1.07  1.24  138  1.46  1.71  2.02  2.04  2.36  2.S6  2.38  1.37  2.18  58.6S
FAuadr  2.98  2.71  2.89  2.18  2.13  2.28  2.28  2.63  2.36  2.47  2.50  2.58  2.49  2.51  0.85
Guatemala  19  1.9  8  1.49  1.19  1.28  1.11  0.9S  1.41  1.46  1.SS  1.48  1.59  1.49  1.41  -5.32
Hoadua  1.13  1.00  0.77  0.78  0.91  0.91  0.96  0.98  1.06  1.09  1.06  1.08  0.92  1.04  13.32
Jama1ua  1.41  1.49  1.46  1.36  1.89  2.18  1.99  2.31  2.66  3.08  2.78  2.73  1.45  2.24  54.42
MeIco  25.27  29.75  18.49  12.24  14.42  16.00  14.02  14.72  20.26  24.10  29.63  35.22  20.03  21.99  9.79
Paluauay  1.31  1.30  1.09  0.84  0.98  0.98  1.14  1.36  1.48  1.69  1.76  2.20  1.17  1.88  61.54
Pcwu  4.01  4.76  4.83  3.59  2.89  2.67  3.30  3.65  3.17  2.71  3.09  3.86  3.65  3.22  -11.88
Tdnia  & Tobgo  2.43  2.22  2.89  2.73  2.26  3.42  3.71  2.74  2.51  2.38  2.S8  3.04  2.77  2.63  -5.05
Uugaay  2.08  2.10  1.81  1.45  1.24  123  1.59  1.84  1.84  1.87  1.82  2.12  1.64  1.90  15.48
Veneza  15.13  16.87  19.69  9.29  14.35  13.82  13.7S  14.93  18.37  12.41  11.77  17.90  15.13  14.02  -7.33
Avege  5.90  6.23  5.76
* FOB inapot  in 1980  US dollas, converted  at IS  Id  exchange  me.
* Average  ino  leveb in the pre-reSrm yea  awce  1980.
Sowa: Wodd Dak (ANDREC)TABLE  A.2:  GROWTH RATES  OF REAL IMPORTS  OF GOODS AND NONFACTOR  SMVICES (pecenr*)
Pedod  Avkgs  1cw...in
AVMe
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1983  1989  1990  1991  FMRefi=&*  RfoOm  Gtvwdi Rao
Argenn  -9.62  .42.38  -4.74  6.14  -14.42  18.13  8.72  -14.45  -17.09  0.14  72.92  -S.4S  1OZ4  15.83
Bolivia  37.73  -37.61  4.58  -16.68  41.68  -2.32  8.27  -10.73  12.77  4.97  2.73  -3.00  9.56  12.56
Brazil  -12.36  -6.03  -17.43  -2.94  0.00  28.68  -2.94  -1.13  8.94  10.06  S.37  -1.68  4.06  5.74
Chile  15.71  -36.33  -15.12  16.SO  -11.00  9.66  17.01  12.22  2S.16  OS9  8.52  -4.81  1036  15.17
Colombia  4.90  7.97  -9.07  -3.96  -6.62  4.06  5.34  6.5S  -2.82  10.81  -6.04  -0.04  1.88  1.92
Cosa Rica  -2634  -18.11  15.81  10.66  6.00  17.58  17.S8  1.03  15.88  8.66  -7.11  -2.40  8.94  11.34
Ecuador  -9.26  6.87  -24.S6  -2.41  7.32  -021  IS.38  -10.1S  4.42  1.32  3.13  -2.13  2.96  5.09
Guatemala  4.10  -20.99  -19.86  7.13  -12.89  -14.40  47.57  3.77  6.29  -4.4S  7.69  -2.S1  3.32  5.83
Honduma  -11.34  -23.58  2.35  15.92  0.38  S.62  2.23  7.46  2.82  -2SS  1.96  40.47  1.68  2.15
lamaica  5.67  -1.90  -7.32  38.97  IS.  -8.86  16.44  15.01  15.98  -9.78  -2.05  5.67  7.20  1.53
Mexco  17.71  -37.8S  -33.80  17.80  11.00  -12.41  S.04  37.61  18.97  22.92  18.87  -9.03  14.57  23.60
Paraguay  0.96  -16.50  -22.59  16.82  -0.S4  16.63  19.43  8.65  13.98  4.26  25.24  2.62  14.49  11.87
Pemi  18.73  1.47  -2S.64  -19.S3  -7.7S  23.81  10.44  -13.13  -1439  13.76  25.04  -1.45  8.14  9.S9
Tridad  & Tobago  -8.63  30.25  -S.52  -17.48  51.76  8.40  -26.27  -8.08  -5.25  8.14  17.80  3.05  6.90  3.85
Unaguay  1.01  -13.60  -20.13  -1432  -1.05  29.36  IS.80  0.05  1.40  -2.74  16.94  -3.12  6.29  9.41
Venezuela  11.47  16.7S  -S2.83  54.46  -3.70  40.53  8.59  23.05  -32.45  -5.17  52.09  7.16  4.82  -2.34
Aveage  -1.1  7.2  83
* FOB impots  in 1980  US ddlar,  convened  at IFS  fw  exage  rea.
Averg  impoort  rwh  i  tb  pKoe-M&M  yeas nw  1980.
S&wce:  Wodd Bank  (ANDREX)i g  0  o  a  i  i  -'  &  >  t  ^  8  i  8  6  - a  ot
- is
_h k  X  uu  uQ  HO  ;  i  ges
t  e  r - ^  ~*.0  0
*3
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61TABLE  A4:  GROWTH RATES OF REAL EXPORTS  OF GOODS AND  NONFACTOR  SERVICES  (prcwu)*
Peaiod  Aves  Ja.  min
A'r.Growth
1981  1982  1983  1984  1s98  1986  1987  Im  1989  1990  1991  Freflm"  Refam  Raw
Argentina  5.50  3.52  7.73  -0.72  12.60  4.13  256  18.75  4.58  16.71  2.23  3.30  10.57  7.27
Bolvia  -4.05  2.19  .4.24  -3.27  -s.89  16.10  -2.48  6.09  24.62  15.54  0.88  -135  9.14  7.79
Bail  21.32  -9.19  1433  21.95  7.03  -10.58  19.24  13.08  5.09  -4.93  1.30  7.48  6.76  -0.72
Chile  -8.95  4.72  0.63  6.79  6.88  9.81  S.79  6.13  16.15  7.18  12.86  0.t0  11.30  1050
Coombia  -11.83  -1.56  -0.89  10.31  1435  20.71  7.79  0.25  8.40  16.74  1.85  0.99  11.68  167
Coda Rica  11.12  -5.46  -131  11.27  -3.99  3.63  21.03  8.78  1S.00  7.57  5.09  2.33  10.18  7.85
Ecuador  4.73  -4.96  2.44  12.53  11.98  8.60  -16.14  31.00  -3.18  5.69  6.21  6.27  2.91  -3.36
Guatemala  -14.41  -8.45  -10.88  -3.23  3.18  -14.10  6.15  5.63  13.9S  10.11  5.92  -5.96  8.90  14.86
Hondua  2.8s  -10.20  0.72  -0.43  7.53  1.80  2.42  .s090  3.87  -0.62  -1.00  0.73  0.06  -0.67
Jmaica  .0.21  -10.69  -0.79  31.69  11.51  7.06  10.21  11.53  0.37  5.86  4.12  -0.21  7.09  7.30
Mexico  11.58  21.78  13.58  5.70  -4.4S  530  10.68  4.97  3.04  5.23  7.14  13.16  4.S6  -4.60
Paraguay  2.57  9.30  -1534  25.11  15.56  -4.13  36.69  5.96  25.14  9.26  -731  9.46  9.03  .0.43
PaM  0.85  6.12  -10.34  9.12  2.92  -1338  -4.81  -10.37  23.89  -7.90  1.43  -2.49  S.80  7.29
Tinidd  & Tobago  -1.S5  -9.19  -2.69  8.73  72.70  -1.34  -4.45  1026  -3.32  13.02  -0.68  6.34  3.01  -3.33
UNsuy  6.17  -1052  15.45  -1.64  6.05  11.49  -. 47  9.15  10.33  10.49  -1.02  4.50  4.10  -0.40
veaela  -5.59  -9.17  -3.02  15.80  -4.14  12.24  -1.31  3.97  S5.3  12.78  0.50  1.10  6.27  S.17
Avege  2.8  7.7  4.9
* POB eot  i  1980 eS  dollr,  caded  at IFS *rf  exhag  se.
"  Average  expod Sri  in do prefiorm  yer  sace  1980.
SosA:  Wodd Bnk  (ANDREX)TABLE AS:  MCffT  EXPORT DUTES 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  19s85  1986  197  1968  1939  1990
Argein  0.00  0.00  5.06  1091  1130  1532  12.38  4.58  2.95  14.94  NA
BO"  0.00  0.00  O.00  0.00  0.00  4.16  0.93  3.71  0.50  0.43  0.00
BR  0.00  o.a0  2.76  633  4.61  2.01  0.4  1.91  2.29  0.62  0.13
ChH*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  NA  NA
Colma  7.29  6.33  3.13  1.56  0.77  2.49  2.9  0.80  0.70  O.5  NA
coda Rica  6.64  8.57  9.95  9.34  7.03  6.  6.92  8.66  9.57  9.20  6.20
Ecuador  3.v7  2.60  1.9S  0.89  0.86  0.94  0.03  0.04  NA  NA  NA
GuMeala  9.85  S.57  437  NA  2.51  0.98  10.70  6.11  3.85  1.74  NA
Hou  7.73  7.49  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
amaica  0.00  0.00  NA  0.00  0.00  0.00  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Mexkc  38.34  41.11  35.35  5.50  0.05  0.07  0.47  0.06  0.07  0.16  0.11
Puay  1.03  0.14  0.36  0.92  0.97  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
PeS  10.92  8.44  S23  2.00  0.74  1.76  1.99  0.00  0.86  1.17  NA
Td7ld d&Tobago  0.00  0.00  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
uguay  0.00  0.02  0.05  5.27  2.11  0.92  1.01  OS4  OSI  0.52  0.71
Venezul  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  NA  0.00  0.00  NA
Expont  dutisFOB  aof  melcandie  epaa.
Sme:ntenaild  Mom"ta  Fund (Gonment  Fuanc  Staistic.  uda  nd  io  Pnia  Sttias)TABLE A.Q  EMPLICIT  IMPORT DUTIES
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  198S  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Argerntin  0.00  24.09  7.23  14.76  10.96  14.29  18.34  17.69  16.08  7.02  NA
Bofivis  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  6.49  12.44  8.82  8.61  9.64  7.87  6.40
Bazil  15.20  4.46  5.29  S.16  5.34  6.08  8.10  7.00  9.14  10.28  9.70
Chile  7.47  8.61  730  11.79  15.61  17.27  125S  12.77  10.91  NA  NA
Colombia  11.34  10.55  10.94  10.95  9.88  14.42  18.00  1933  18.21  16.71  NA
Costa Rica  6.21  3.42  2.98  4.24  8.75  9.69  11.05  11.26  19.14  16.08  10.11
Ecuador  i6.27  16.85  13.49  16.64  17.6S  22.13  16.89  11.38  13.98  NA  NA
Guatemala  7.00  6.23  5.61  NA  10.42  11.89  14.79  13.78  15.93  IS.02  NA
Hondua  7.42  10.55  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Jnuica  2.18  3.47  NA  8.18  3.74  3.93  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Meaco  10.97  1O.S  9.26  7.99  6.47  8.60  9.02  9.62  4.93  7.74  S.10  t
Paguay  14.44  14.76  10.53  11.00  7.76  8.67  9.32  7.44  10.62  7.60  6.91
Pern  21.19  21.83  18.91  17.21  23.20  27.77  23.25  23.34  12.75  17.26  NA
Trinidad  & Tobago  5.57  6.26  6.44  9.17  10.09  8.13  6.44  5.34  4.21  3.37  NA
Uruguay  19.09  19.1S  18.12  10.2S  12.11  13.50  16.7S  13.80  13.34  11.68  12.96
Veniela  8.86  9.8S  12.60  12.92  8.03  10.23  12.77  11.18  11.41  1.40  NA
*  All impd  duuCI  vahle of nmaodue  Imt
Sov,e: I1tazadona  Nony  Fund (GoveowznA Fin  Ststigicm and  _gnadutAI  PFi  a  _I  &.gS1c1)TABLE  A.7:  NOM1NAL  EXCHANGE  RATES (period  verges of local  crmecy per US dol)*
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991
Argentina  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.49  0.95
Bolivia  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.44  1.92  2.05  235  2.69  3.17  3.58
Bra7A  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.26  2.83  68.30  406.61
Chile  39.00  39.00  50.91  78.84  98.66  161.08  193.02  219.54  245.05  267.16  305.06  349.37
Colombia  47.28  54.49  64.08  78.85  100.82  142.31  194.26  242.61  299.17  382.57  502.26  633.05
Costa Rica  8.57  21.76  37.41  41.09  44.53  S0.4S  55.99  62.78  75.80  81.50  91.58  122.43
Ecuador  25.00  25.00  30.03  44.12  62.54  69.56  122.78  170.46  301.61  526.3S  767.75  104625
Guatenmla  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.88  2.50  2.62  2.82  4.49  5.03
Honduras  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  4.11  5.32
lamaica  1.78  1.78  1.78  1.93  3.94  S.56  S.48  S.49  5.49  5.74  7.18  12.12
Mexico  22.95  24.51  56.40  120.09  167.83  256.87  611.77  1378.18  2273.10  2461.47  2812.60  3018.43  W
Paraguay  126.00  126.00  126.00  126.00  201.00  306.67  339.17  550.00  550.00  1056.22  1229.81  1325.18
Pcu  0.29  0.42  0.70  1.63  3.47  10.97  12.95  16.1  128.83  2666.00  187886.0  NA
Trinidad  & Tobago  2.40  2.40  2.40  2.40  2.40  2.45  3.60  3.60  3.84  4.25  425  4.2S
Umguay  9.10  10.82  13.91  34.54  56.12  101.43  151.99  226.67  359.44  605.51  1171.05  2018.82
Venezuela  4.29  4.29  4.29  4.29  7.02  7.50  8.08  14.50  14.50  34.68  46.90  56.82
&  WS  hxd  exchMang  VM1FS.
Sowrce:  Inteuations Moeatary  Fund (nternaional Fnaneial  Statislics)TABLE  A.8: REAL  MULTILATERAL  EXCHANGE  RAtE INDEX  (witb  top  20  trdig  partner  u  1980  tde  wes
Dq=cW=
1930  1981  1982  1983  1934  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  PrmAa  Stt  of  Rt  of
Reform  period
Argentina  100.00  90.77  46.2S  44.99  53.036  47.18  49.50  46.65  45.19  60.64  56.92  Yes  Ye  No
Boivia  100.00  131.78  15633  134.97  145.05  359.60  94.50  94.09  86.87  81.46  76.03  No  Yes  Yes
Bril  100.00  115.02  123.82  99.43  91.83  90.53  92.26  99.73  107.87  129.68  IS2.73  Yes  No  No
Cile  100.00  118.78  109.45  89.25  83.13  71.52  62.76  60.94  57.67  59.93  61.74  Yes  Yes  Yes
Colombia  100.00  108.52  117.23  11S.97  107.77  95.90  7S33  69.51  67.79  6S.99  62.13  Yeo  Yes  Yes
Cosa  Rica  100.00  S4.31  56.02  66.66  67.42  6625  61.11  55.08  58.12  70.00  77.75  Yes  Yes  No
Ecuador  100.00  109.35  10936  110.24  101.80  120.30  79.52  69.33  5932  56.82  56.97  Yes  Yes  You
Guatemal  100.00  10838  107.03  109.20  112.48  130353  107.86  68.00  72.16  78.47  54.12  Yes  Yes  Yes
Hondra  100.00  105.00  113.76  12130  12735  129.63  126.80  120.81  124.84  141.67  146.16  No  Yes  No
Jamica  100.00  103.43  108.02  112.67  67.45  60.15  7236  75.04  78.08  81.44  76.52  No  No  Yes
Mexico  100.00  114.14  8456  75.06  83.17  93.48  70.23  66.27  82.17  8.23  92.06  No  No  Yet
Puay  100.00  122.64  108.20  100.90  94.91  82.03  82.61  66.45  68.83  52.42  50.94  Yes  You  You
Pea  100.00  115.76  120.43  111.41  110.74  91.70  120.71  174.37  232.76  240.34  250.25  No  No  No
Triidad & Tabgo  100.00  108.76  120.46  138.91  IS8.69  170.32  121.51  129.77  124.85  122.52  131.41  Yes  Yes  No
Urgay  100.00  109.42  IS.20  7137  6730  66.56  71.85  73.62  71.63  71.75  70.40  No  You  You
Veneuela  100.00  111.02  121.66  129.93  91.94  94.70  95.43  61.89  76.11  60.81  54.97  Yes  Yes  Yes
* Ihe  Mmllae  exchape  rat  blah  avenge of the country'sr  exnpg  rae with its tp  20  tg  paertu  (cho  accrding  to the 1979-83  avenp  iha  of tmade)
weighd by the 1980 aof  ude.  An incu  in  tidex l  appretionof  e ral  ehneate.
Soe:  Wodd Bnk calculao25
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